Former soldier in Iran's Revolutionary Guard writes of life as CIA spy

Washington (CNN) -- The tale contains elements of a spy thriller: a soldier in Iran's feared Revolutionary Guard turns spy for the CIA after concluding that the government that had promised democracy had instead ushered in oppression, violence and death.
But Reza Kahlili says this is no novel.
In his new book, "A Time to Betray: The Astonishing Double Life of a CIA Agent Inside the Revolutionary Guards of Iran," Kahlili offers a first-hand account of how he turned against the Islamic regime that he said has oppressed its people for three decades.
In one of his first public appearances, Kahlili addressed a packed hall Friday at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Flanked by a bodyguard and disguised in a hat, mask and glasses, he spoke through a modulator that led Washington Post columnist David Ignatius to liken his voice to Darth Vader's. Even his name is a pseudonym, all in an effort to protect his family, friends and contacts, he said.
The author said that, after a peaceful childhood in Iran, he came to the United States in the 1970s for college, studying computer science at the University of Southern California, where he enjoyed a carefree life of parties, watching football and listening to Pink Floyd and Jethro Tull.
He returned home after the sudden death of his father to find a country embroiled in change.
Kahlili describes the immediate aftermath of the 1979 revolution against Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi as a special time in Iran. Iranians had been led to believe democracy was theirs, the clergy wouldn't interfere in their lives and the people would have freedom of speech, assembly and political affiliation, he said. Everyone was excited about the direction of the country, he said.
It was then that Khalili's friend told him about an opportunity with the newly formed, elite Revolutionary Guard, which hired him immediately.
Reza said he quickly became disillusioned when he saw people being tortured and murdered and women raped in Tehran's notorious Evin Prison. Repressing his countrymen, he said, was not what he had signed up for.
But rather than quit the Guard and endanger his family, he contacted the CIA and began work as an American agent under the code name "Wally," he said.
There was no magic watch or pen or fancy car like James Bond, he said, just a pencil and a notebook. He was trained in communications and deciphering codes. Kahlili said his role "was to look and act the part of a devout Muslim enforcing all the new rules laid down by the mullahs."
"A full black beard was a mandatory accessory to the Guard's uniform, and I sported one along with every other member of the Guards. The image of a scowling, black-bearded Guard in uniform mustered fear and garnered respect. Playing the part of a zealot did not come naturally to me, and there were times I had to do things I dreaded: cautioning young girls to cover up, barking at kids for not displaying proper Islamic behavior, taking on the persona of a fanatic. I knew I would have to try to convince myself that doing these things allowed me to maintain my role -- and maintaining my role allowed me to contribute to the downfall of the organization to which I so fervently imitated allegiance."
He said he provided critical information to his CIA handlers about Iran's role in the Iran-Iraq war, the Iran-contra affair, the bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut and the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, which he said was masterminded by Tehran.
Kahlili described a CIA that knew little about what was going on inside Iran and was complacent about finding out the truth about the regime. He said he warned his case officers in the mid-1980s about the growing danger of the Guard, but said U.S. officials sat idly by, alternating indifference and negotiation with the regime he was working to take down.
This "misconception" of Iran, he said, has plagued America's decisionmaking for three decades.
After a few scares in which he thought his cover was blown, Kahlili left Iran, was granted asylum in the United States and moved to California. He said he no longer works for the CIA, but still provides the agency with information from his contacts in Iran about the regime, its nuclear program, its terrorist activities in the region and its continued oppression of the Iranian people.
He said that, after the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks and the 2005 election of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadenijad, he decided to speak out publicly to raise awareness of the brutality of the regime.
He predicted that Iran will eventually attack Israel, Europe and the Gulf and advocated a preemptive military strike against the regime but not against the Iranian people or infrastructure.
Kahlili accused the Obama administration of naivete and betrayal for seeking to engage Iran. Not only does the regime see this as weakness on the part of the United States, he said, but the Iranian people view it as a betrayal of the highest order as they fight for freedom.
"Stop dreaming, please," he said Friday. "You are not dealing with rational people. Every time you extend a hand, it is not seen as sincerity, but stupidity."
The CIA's public affairs office in Washington was not open Friday night and its telephone number would not accept messages; its e-mail account rejected two attempts to send it a message.

Report: Key information on CIA base bomber wasn't relayed

Washington (CNN) -- Prior to a suicide attack on a CIA base in Afghanistan last December, some people within the CIA and the Jordanian intelligence service were skeptical about the reliability of a Jordanian informant, but those concerns were not passed on to officers on the base, according to a U.S. intelligence official.
A Jordanian intelligence officer told his U.S. counterpart in Amman, Jordan, that Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi might be working for al Qaeda and could be attempting to lure the Americans into a trap, but "unfortunately, some of those concerns weren't properly documented or conveyed through formal channels," the U.S. official said.
The findings are part of a just-completed CIA review of the attack, in which al-Balawi detonated a suicide bomb concealed under his clothing, taking seven CIA employees and two other people with him.
CIA director's lessons from the attack
Al-Balawi initially had been recruited by the Jordanian spy agency and brought to the attention of the CIA. He had come to the base in Khost, Afghanistan, for his first face-to-face meeting with CIA officers to discuss information he was believed to have on Ayman Zawahiri, al Qaeda's second in command.
When he got out of the car, and before a security search, he triggered the bomb. Killed were CIA officers, agency security contractors, the Afghan driver and a Jordanian intelligence officer assigned to al-Balawi. Six CIA employees were seriously injured.
The U.S. intelligence official said the concerns about al-Balawi did not make their way to the right people, including those at the base who might have been more cautious in dealing with the man they thought could be a valuable asset.
Personnel on the ground there were not responsible for vetting al-Balawi, and they believed others had done so when they let him on the base, the source said.
Al-Balawi might have been found out if there had been better communication within the CIA, said the official.
"In this case there was excessive reliance on informal communications, such as e-mails and instant messaging," the intelligence official said, "and more should have been conveyed through formal channels -- that is, cables from the field."
In a message to employees on Tuesday, CIA Director Leon Panetta said the review by 14 agency officers recommended 23 changes to CIA management oversight, communications, training and security procedures.
One of the changes requires informants to be searched in more isolated areas by far fewer CIA officers.
The U.S. intelligence official said Panetta decided not to pin blame on individuals because he feels this was a systemic failure and because the deaths of the CIA personnel in Khost means all of the facts will never be known.
The CIA internal report, along with a just-completed outside review, will be sent to the intelligence agency's inspector general, who might have different or additional recommendations.